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Schema-Directed Processes in Language Comprehension
In this paper I will develop the thesis that the knowledge a person
already possesses has a potent influence on what he or she will learn and
remember from exposure to discourse. I will begin by outlining some assump-
tions about the characteristics of the structures in which existing know-
ledge is packaged. Next, based on these assumptions, I will present a
speculative theoretical treatment of the processes involved in assimilating
the information and ideas in discourse. This is the topic that will be
given most attention in this paper. Data consistent with the theory will
be summarized. It should be emphasized in advance, however, that our
experiments to date show at most that the theoretical notions are inter-
esting and plausible. The research has not advanced to the point where
we have a firm basis for choosing between competing accounts. Finally,
I will make some observations about the implications of this research for
education.
Schematic Knowledge Structures
Like many others (Ausuble, 1963; Minsky, 1975; Schank & Abelson,
1975; Bower, 1976; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977), I find it useful to postulate
that knowledge is incorporated in abstract structures that have certain
properties. These structures will be called schemata in deference to
Piaget (1926) and Bartlett (1932), who introduced the term to psychology.
What follows is an amalgam of my own thinking and that of other theorists.
A schema represents generic knowledge; that is, it represents what
is believed to be generally true of a class of things, events, or situations.
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A schema is conceived to contain a slot or placeholder for each component.
For instance, a Face schema (Palmer, 1975) includes slots for a mouth,
nose, eyes, and ears. Encoding a particular object is conceived to be a
matter of filling the slots in the schema with the features of the object.
Part of schematic knowledge is the specification of the constraints on
what normally can fill the slots. An object will be recognized as a face
only if it has features that qualify as eyes, a mouth, a nose, and so on.
To be sure, the constraints on the slots in a Face schema are flexible
enough that we can tolerate considerable variation, as in a sketchy drawing
in a comic strip, the stylized and transformed representation in a cubist
painting or the exaggerated portrayal in a political cartoon (Gombrich,
1972). Nonetheless, there are limits beyond which an object is no longer
a face.
The encoded representation of a particular thing or event consists
of a copy of the schemata which were brought to bear in interpretation
plus the information inserted in the schemata's slots. Such particularized
representations are called instantiated schemata (cf. Anderson, Pichert,
Goetz, Schallert, Stevens, & Trollip, 1976). The slots in a schema may
be instantiated with information that could be said to be "given" in the
situation, or message, but often slots are filled by inference.
A schema is a knowledge "structure" because it indicates the typical
relations among its components. A Face schema will represent the relative
spatial positioning of the eyes and nose, for instance. Another attribute
of schemata with structural significance is that they exist at various
levels of abstraction and embed one within another (Rumelhart & Ortony,
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1977). Contrast the knowledge that (1) a face has eyes, (2) an eye has a
pupil, (3) a pupil dialates in the dark. It is apparent that these propo-
sitions are arranged in decreasing order of importance to faces. This
variation in importance can be captured by assuming that Eye is a subschema
embedded in the Face schema; and that Pupil, in turn, is a subschema of
Eye. It is assumed that a person can employ a dominant schema without
necessarily accessing the knowledge available in embedded subschemata.
On the other hand, should the occasion demand it, the full meaning of a
subschema can be unpacked and a deeper interpretation given.
To comprehend a message is to place a construction upon it which gives
a coherent formulation of its contents. In schema terms, a "coherent
formulation" means a one-to-one correspondence between the slots in a
schema and the "givens" in the message. It is instructive to examine the
comprehension of a sentence devised by Bransford and McCarrell (1974) for
which a subsuming schema is not readily apparent: The notes were sour
because the seams split. The syntax is simple and the individual words
are easy, yet the sentence as a whole does not immediately make sense to
most people. However, the sentence becomes meaningful as soon as one hears
the clue bagpipe. Why is this clue effective? An answer is that it
enables the conception of a framework which maps onto a possible world.
Within the framework each word in the sentence can be construed to have a
referent with a sensible role to play in the possible world. That is to
say, the clue allows one to invoke a schema containing slots for the
objects, actions, and qualities mentioned in the sentence. The schema
gives a good account of the sentence and, therefore, there is the subjective
sense that it has been comprehended.
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Conceptions of the Reading Process
According to one view, reading is a "bottom-up" or "data-driven"
process (Bobrow & Norman, 1975). There is a series of discrete processing
stages each corresponding to a level of linguistic analysis. Analysis
proceeds from the most primitive low-order level to the most complex high-
order level. As a first step, feature analyzers are brought to bear to
discriminate horizontal, vertical, and oblique line segments; open and
closed loops; intersection with a horizontal plane; and so on. From these,
letters are identified. Strings of letters are analyzed into clusters
with morphophonemic significance. Words are recognized. Strings of words
are parsed into phrase constituents. Word meanings are retrieved from the
subjective lexicon. Eventually a semantic interpretation of a sentence
is produced. Sentence meaning is conceived to be the deterministic product
of the lower-order levels of analysis and, presumably, the meaning of a
text is a concantenation of the meanings of its component sentences.
Another view holds that reading is essentially a "top-down" or
"conceptually driven" process. Rather than analyzing a text squiggle by
squiggle, the reader samples it to confirm or reject hypotheses about its
content. In other words, reading is conceived to be a psycholinguistic
guessing game (Goodman, 1967). The reader's expectations represent a form
of preprocessing which should expedite and speed up subsequent analysis.
Occasionally expectation would be predicted to override the print, as
appears to happen when children make miscues in oral reading, substituting
semantically related words in place of those given.
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There is an interesting difference between the bottom-up and top-down
theories about reading in their treatment of ambiguity. According to the
former view a high-order process does not affect low-order processes. Each
stage takes as its input the output from the preceding stage. If an
ambiguity arises at any stage, the alternative interpretations are sent
forward for resolution at a later point. For instance, it would be supposed
that all of the meanings of a homonym are accessed. Eventually, if the
message as a whole is not ambiguous, a process operating on syntax, seman-
tics, or pragmatics at the phrase, sentence, or text level, will permit a
choice among the homonym's senses.
From the perspective of a bottom-up model, reading is a matter of
growing a tree of possible interpretations. Any stage may add new branches,
or prune some of those already there. From the perspective of a model
that admits of possible top-down influences, on the other hand, not all
of the branches need be grafted on to the tree in the first place. Emerging
high-order expectations may forstall some interpretations before they occur.
With respect to the meaning of a homonym, it might be expected that normally
only the contextually most appropriate meaning would be accessed. this is
the implication of research by Schvaneveldt, Meyer, and Becker (1974)
using a lexical decision task. For instance, money was identified as a
word faster in the sequence save, bank, money than in either river, bank,
money, or the control sequences save, date, money or fig, date, money.
If all senses of a word were activated, bank should have primed money to
some extent even when preceded by river, but this did not happen. Con-
verging evidence has been obtained by Swinney and Hakes (1976) who found,
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using a phoneme monitoring task, that a disambiguating context of a sentence
or two can constrain the interpretation of a subsequently encountered
homonym.
Of course, it is surely simplistic to imagine that reading is either
a bottom-up or a top-down process. Rumelhart (1976) has presented a
persuasive case that reading must involve continuous interactions among
many levels of analysis. I am dealing in this paper with how concepts
brought to a text influence comprehension, learning, and recall but, to
assert the obvious, the processes involved in analyzing the print itself
are also crucial.
Schemata and Text Interpretation
We have used several tricks to get people to bring different schemata
into play when reading text. Several studies have employed whole passages
which were ambiguous. For instance, Schallert (1976) constructed passages
that could be given two distinct interpretations. One of the passages
told of a character who was afraid that his best pitchers would crack in
the heat. The passage was entitled "Worries of a baseball manager" or
"Worries of a glassware factory manager." Scores on a multiple-choice
test--constructed so that the interpretation of pitcher and other similarly
ambiguous elements could be distinguished--indicated that the interpretation
of this and other passages was strongly related to the title.
In the absence of strong contextual cues, such as titles and intro-
ductions, the schemata by which people assimilate ambiguous passages can
be expected to depend upon their background and life situation. Anderson,
Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (1977) wrote the following passage:
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Every Saturday night, four good friends get together. When
Jerry, Mike, and Pat arrived, Karen was sitting in her living
room writing some notes. She quickly gathered the cards and
stood up to greet her friends at the door. They followed her
into the living room but as usual they couldn't agree on
exactly what to play. Jerry eventually took a stand and set
things up. Finally, they began to play. Karen's recorder
filled the room with soft and pleasant music. Early in the
evening, Mike noticed Pat's hand and the many diamonds. As
the night progressed the tempo of play increased. Finally,
a lull in the activities occurred. Taking advantage of this,
Jerry pondered the arrangement in front of him. Mike inter-
rupted Jerry's reverie and said, "Let's hear the score." They
listened carefully and commented on their performance. When
the comments were all heard, exhausted but happy, Karen's
friends went home.
Most people interpret this passage in terms of an evening of cards but it
can be interpreted as about a rehearsal of a woodwind ensemble. Another
passage is usually seen as about a convict planning his escape from prison,
however it is possible to see it in terms of a wrestler hoping to break
the hold of an opponent. These passages were read by a group of physical
education students and a group of music students. Scores on a multiple-
choice test and theme-revealing disambiguations and intrusions in free
recall indicated that the interpretation given to passages bore the
expected strong relationship to the subject's background. An example
of an intrusion showing a card theme was, "Mike sees that Pat's hand has
a lot of hearts." One showing a music theme was, "As usual they couldn't
decide on the piece of music to play."
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Of special significance to the discussion in this section were res-
ponses on a debriefing questionnaire. Subjects were asked whether they
became aware of another possible interpretation of either passage. The
interesting fact is that 62% reported that another interpretation never
occurred to them, while an additional 20% said they became aware of an
alternative interpretation during the multiple-choice test or when res-
ponding to the debriefing questionnaire. Less than 20% said they were
aware of a second interpretation while reading a passage. Many people would
not wish to place too much stock in retrospective reports. Still, these
are the results that would be expected on the basis of top-down, schema-
based processing.
Gordon Bower (cf. 1977) and his coworkers at Stanford have completed
several studies which parallel those done in my laboratory. One study
involved stories about characters who visit the doctor. An examination is
completed and the doctor smiles and says, "Well, it seems my expectations
have been confirmed." The base story was, in Bower's words, "a sort of
neutral Rorshach card onto which subjects could project their own meanings"
(1977, p. 8). The introduction to one version of the story describes the
character as worried about whether she is pregnant. Here subjects tended
to recall the doctor's remark as, "Your fears have been confirmed" or
simply, "You're pregnant." An alternate introduction described the main
character as a wrestler worried about being underweight. Subjects who
read this version remembered that the doctor told the character he was
gaining weight.
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In another study, Bower and his associates used a story about a series
of mishaps that happen when a TV commercial involving water skiing is filmed.
Alternate introductions were written to cause the reader to identify with
either Harry, the boatdriver, or Rich, the water skier. On a recognition
test subjects tended to rate as explicitly part of the text statements
formulated from the perspective of the character with whom they were led
to identify. For instance, more subjects given the water skier than the
boatdriver introduction identified, "The handle was torn from Rich's grasp
as the boat unexpectedly jumped ahead," as a proposition from the text.
The reverse was true of the parallel formulation of the same episode written
from the boatdriver's perspective: "Rich slipped and lost control and the
handle went skipping across the water."
The general point illustrated by these experiments is that the meaning
of a text arises in an interaction between the characteristics of the
message and the reader's existing knowledge and analysis of context.
Ambiguous passages are useful for making transparent the role of world
knowledge and context. However, there is every reason to suppose that
they are equally important when comprehending material which would be said
to be "unambiguous." A message has an unambiguous meaning just in case
there is consensus in a linguistic community about the schemata that
normally will subsume it. The role of knowledge of the world is merely
less obvious to the psychologist doing prose memory research in these cases,
for the author, reader, and the judges who score the protocols employ
complementary schemata and thus give essentially the same interpretation
to the material.
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Schemata and the Significance of Text Elements
Since Binet and Henri (1894; Thieman & Brewer, in press) worked with
French school children at the end of the nineteenth century, it has been
known that people are more likely to learn and remember the important
than the unimportant elements of a prose passage. No doubt authors pro-
vide linguistic cues to the important points in a text; however, I shall
argue that importance is largely a derivative of the schemata the reader
imposes on the text.
The schema brought to bear on a text will contain embedded subschemata
which generally can be conceived to form a hierarchy. The position of a
subschema in the hierarchy is one index of its importance. Significant
text information instantiates high-order slots in the structure. The schema
could be said to "give" such information its importance. It follows that
the importance of a text element would vary if readers were caused to
invoke schemata in which the text element played a greater or lesser role.
This hypothesis has been investigated in two lines of research in my
laboratory.
Anderson, Spiro, and Anderson (1977) wrote two passages--one about
dining at a fancy restaurant, the other a closely comparable story about
shopping at a supermarket. The same eighteen items of food, attributed
to the same characters, were mentioned in the same order in the two stories.
Subjects read one of the stories and then, after an interval, attempted
reca 11.
The first prediction was that the food items would be better learned
and recalled when presented in the restaurant narrative. The reasoning
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was that a dining-at-a-fancy restaurant schema contains a more finely
articulated structure. That is, certain categories of food will be
ordered and served. And, there are constraints on the items that can fit
into these categories; hot dogs will not be the main course nor Koolaid
the beverage. Just about any food or beverage fits a supermarket schema.
This prediction was confirmed in two experiments.
The second experiment involved food categories determined on the basis
of a norming study to have a high or a low probability of being in an
individual's restaurant schema. An entree and a drink during the meal
are examples, respectively, of the low and high categories. An entree
is an essential element. No fine meal would be complete without one. A
drink during dinner is a less central, perhaps optional element. Subjects
who read the restaurant story recalled substantially more of the foods
and beverages from three high probability categories than subjects who
read the supermarket story. In contrast there was no difference between
the two passages on items from three low probability categories. This shows
that the restaurant narrative did not indiscriminately facilitate performance
as would be expected if it were overall more interesting, coherent or
memorable. Instead, as predicted, there was selective enhancement of
items from just those categories that have special importance in a res-
taurant schema.
The next prediction was that subjects would more accurately ascribe
foods to characters when given the restaurant story. Who gets what food
has significance within a restaurant schema whereas it matters not in a
supermarket who throws the brussel sprouts into the shopping cart. In
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both experiments the conditional probability of attributing a food item
to the correct character given that the item had been recalled was higher
among subjects who received the restaurant than the supermarket story.
Finally, it was predicted that order of recall of food items would
correspond more closely to order of mention for subjects who read the
restaurant passage. There is not, or need not be, a prescribed sequence
for selecting foods in a grocery store, but at a fine restaurant it would
be peculiar to have a strawberry parfait before the escargot. In the first
experiment, the average correlation between recall order and order of
mention was significantly higher for the group that received the res-
taurant than the supermarket narrative. The trend was in the same direc-
tion but not significant in the second experiment, perhaps because recall
was attempted shortly after reading. There had been an hour and a half
interval before recall in the first study. Maybe surface order information
is available shortly after reading and this makes the generic order informa-
tion inherent in a schema superfluous.
The experiments just described used the trick of weaving the same
information into two different narratives in order to get readers to
assimilate that information to two different schemata. The device in a
second, parallel line of research was to ask subjects to read a narrative
from alternative points of view which, presumably, caused them to invoke
different schemata. Pichert and Anderson (1977) asked subjects to read
stories from one of two perspectives or no directed perspective. One of
the stories ostensibly was about what two boys do when skipping school.
They go to one of the boy's homes since his mother is never home on
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Thursdays. It is a well-to-do family with a luxuriously appointed home.
It has a number of attractive features such as spacious grounds, a tall
hedge that hides the house from the road, and a new stone fireplace.
However, it also has some defects including a musty basement and a leaky
roof. The family has many valuable possessions--silverware, a coin collec-
tion, a color TV set. Readers were asked to approach the story from the
viewpoint of a burglar or a prospective homebuyer. Obviously a coin
collection is important to a burglar but unimportant to a homebuyer. The
opposite is true of a musty basement or a leaking roof. In a preliminary
experiment the average intercorrelation of rated idea unit importance
across three perspectives on each of two stories was determined to be
quite low, which is in itself evidence that schemata determine the sig-
nificance of text elements.
The next experiment manipulated perspective to investigate the effects
of schemata on text learning and recall. The previously obtained ratings
of idea unit importance were strongly related to immediate recall and,
independently, to delayed recall. This was true just of ratings obtained
under the perspective the subject was directed to take, not other possible
but nonoperative perspectives. Rating of importance under the operative
perspective was a significant predictor of recall in five of six step-
wise multiple regression analyses (one for each of three perspectives on
each of two stories). It was the only significant predictor in four of
these analyses.
The past few years have seen increasing refinement of the notion of
importance in terms of theories of text structure (cf. Kintsch, 1974;
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Meyer, 1975; Rumelhart, 1975; Mandler & Johnson, 1977). These are more
properly regarded as theories of the structure of the schemata by which a
linguistic community normally will subsume a message, as some theorists
expressly acknowledge. But a text need not be read "normally." Depending
on the reader's goal, task, or perspective he or she may override the
conventions a linguistic community ordinarily uses to structure a text.
When the schema changes, then, so will the importance of text elements.
Possible Effects of Schemata on Encoding and Retrieving Text Information
In this section I shall give a more detailed account of some of the
mechanisms by which schemata may affect the processing of text information.
The phenomenon that I will concentrate on explaining is the primacy of
important text in recall illustrated in the preceding section.
Significant text elements might be better recalled because they are
better learned. In other words, the effect might be attributable to a
process at work when a passage is read. An attractive possibility is that
the schema provide the device by which a reader allocates attention. Extra
attention might be devoted to important text elements whereas insignificant
elements might be skimmed or processed less deeply. A second possibility
on the encoding side is that a schema provides "ideational scaffolding,"
to use Ausubel's (1963) apt term, for selected categories of text informa-
tion. A schema will contain slots for important information, but may
contain no slots, or only optional slots, for unimportant information.
According to this view information gets encoded precisely because there
is a niche for it in the structure. This is an interesting idea, but as
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yet I have been unable to think of any implication of the ideational
scaffolding hypothesis that might permit it to be distinguished from the
regulation-of-attention notion.
The fact that people recall more important than unimportant text
elements might be due to processes at work when information is retrieved
and used, instead of, or in addition to, processes acting when the informa-
tion was initially encoded. There are several possible retrieval mechanisms
that fall out of a schema-theoretic orientation which might account for
the primacy of important text information in recall.
The first can be called the "retrieval plan" hypothesis. The idea is
that the schema provides the structure for searching memory. Consider for
illustration the burglar perspective on the story about two boys playing
hooky from school. The rememberer will possess the generic knowledge that
burglars need to have a way of entering a premise; that they are interested
in finding valuable, portable objects that can be fenced easily; that they
are concerned to avoid detection; and that they aim to make clean getaways.
Memory search is presumed to start with the generic concerns of a burglar.
Generic concerns implicate selected categories of text information. For
instance, the fact that all burglars need to enter the place to be robbed
is assumed to provide a mental pathway or implicit cue for the specific
proposition that the side door was kept unlocked. On the other hand,
information in a text which may have been encoded but does not connect
with the schema guiding memory search should be relatively inaccessible.
For example, the passage about the boys playing hooky from school asserts
that the house has new stone siding. Presumably there are no pointers in
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a burglary schema to information of this type and, thus, this information
is unlikely to be retrieved even if it were stored.
We have termed another possible retrieval explanation the "output
editing" hypothesis. The assumption is that the schema contains within
itself an index of importance. The rememberer establishes a response
criterion based jointly on this index, motivation, and demand characteris-
tics. There are several variants on how output editing might work. In
crudest form, the subject simply might not write down information that
occurred to him or her because it falls below the response criterion.
I will consider, finally, the possibility that people may remember
more important than unimportant information because of a process of "infer-
ential reconstruction" (Spiro, 1977). There may be information missing
from memory either because the information was not stored, or because it
has been forgotten. The conceptual machinery of the schema and the informa-
tion that can be recalled may permit the rememberer to fill gaps by
inference. Anderson, Spiro, and Anderson (1977) have illustrated how the
process might work as follows. Suppose that a person is trying to recall
a story about a meal at a fine restaurant (see the preceding section).
The beverage served with the meal cannot be recalled, but since there is
a slot in a restaurant schema for such an item, the rememberer is led to
try to reconstruct one. If the information that beef was served for the
main course can be recalled, then red wine may be generated as a candidate
beverage. There are a couple of possible scenarious at this point. Red
wine might be produced simply as a plausible guess. A good guess and an
element actually remembered often will be indistinguishable to a judge,
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particularly one applying lenient, gist scoring criteria. Or, it might
be that once a candidate element, such as red wine, has been produced it
is checked against an otherwise inaccessible memory trace. To say this
another way, the process might be one of generation followed by recogni-
tion and verification (Kintsch, 1974). In any event, the foregoing gives
an account of the primacy of important text information, for the schema
is more likely to contain the concepts for reconstructing important than
unimportant elements.
Evidence for Encoding and Retrieval Benefits
We have completed several experiments to determine whether schemata
have independent effects on the encoding and retrieval of text information
and, if so, to begin to pin down the specific mechanisms that are responsible
My student, Jim Pichert, and I (Anderson & Pichert, 1977) asked under-
graduates to read the story about two boys playing hooky from school from
the perspective of either a burglar or a homebuyer. The story was recalled
once from the same perspective from which it had been read. Then everyone
recalled the story for a second time. Half the subjects did so again from
the same perspective. The other half changed perspectives. Based on
previously obtained ratings, a cluster of information important to a
burglar but unimportant to a homebuyer (e.g., a collection of rare coins),
and another cluster important to a homebuyer but unimportant to a burglar
(e.g., a fireplace), were identified. As expected, subjects produced on
the second recall a significant amount of new information--that is, informa-
tion that had not been recalled the first time--which was important in
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the light of the new perspective, but which was unimportant in terms of
the perspective operative when the passage was read and recalled the
first time. There does not appear to be any way to explain this finding
solely in terms of encoding mechanisms. Thus, it seems to be rather
strong evidence for a retrieval mechanism independent of encoding.
In the preceding section three explanations within schema theory for
an influence on retrieval were discussed. To review briefly, the first
is the retrieval plan hypothesis: a new schema will furnish implicit cues
for different types of text information. The second is the output editing
hypothesis: when the schema changes different types of information are
above a response criterion. The third is the inferential reconstruction
hypothesis: a new schema will provide the concepts for infering different
categories of important but unavailable information.
In a follow-up study, Pichert and I replicated the retrieval benefit
identified in the experiment described above. We also collected subjects'
introspective descriptions of the processes of learning and remembering.
Most subjects discussed strategies and tactics for remembering in a manner
consistent with the retrieval plan hypothesis. A number said in so many
words that reviewing the concerns of a burglar or homebuyer caused them
to think of previously unrecalled information related to these concerns.
For example, one subject said, "I was thinking . . . was there anything
wrong with the house? And then I remembered the basement was damp."
Another said, "I remembered [the color TV] in the second one, but not
the first one. I was thinking about things to steal, things to take and
steal . . ."
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The self-report protocols generally gave little support to the output
editing hypothesis. Most subjects insisted that they wrote down everything
they could remember. John Surber, another student of mine, manipulated
the incentive for recall. He reasoned that if the increment in recall in
the perspective-shift group were due to output editing, then the increment
would disappear under conditions of high incentive. What he actually found
was a difference in favor of subjects who shifted perspective regardless
of whether a 25¢ bonus was paid for each new idea. Thus, two strands of
evidence weigh against an output editing interpretation of the results of
this series of experiments. I do not wish to argue that people never
suppress information available to them, only that this probably was not a
major factor under the conditions that have prevailed in our research.
Spiro (1977) has obtained convincing evidence for reconstructive
processes in memory for discourse. Subjects read a story about a couple
engaged to be married. The man is strongly against having children. In
one version of the story the woman is elated to find this out because she
doesn't want children either. In the other version, she is horrified
because a large family is important to her. Several minutes after reading
the story subjects are told either that the couple did get married or that
they broke up. Based on the assumption that people's common-sense psychology
of interpersonal relations could be represented in terms of Heider's
principle of structural balance, Spiro predicted the particular types of
"reconciling errors"' subjects would introduce into their recall protocols
when the situation described to them was imbalanced. For instance, when
the couple got married despite the serious disagreement about having
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children, it was argued that subjects would modify the story to reconcile
the incongruity by claiming, for instance, that "the problem was resolved
when they found out that Margie couldn't have children anyway." The
expected types of reconciling inferences appeared with increasing fre-
quency over a retention interval of six weeks. Subjects were more confi-
dent their inferences had been part of the story than they were that
propositions that had an explicit basis in the text had been present.
The perspective shift studies described earlier in this section all
showed a retrieval benefit but, for a couple of reasons, none clearly
established that schemata have an encoding influence as well. This was
the purpose of another experiment completed by Jim Pichert and me. A
story was recalled just once, from either the same perspective from which
it was read or a different one. Both the perspective from which the
story was read and the perspective from which it was recalled, which were
orthogonal factors in the design employed, had a substantial effect on
performance. Thus, both encoding and retrieval influences were demonstrated.
When asked how the assigned perspective affected the manner in which
the story was read, most subjects described a process of directing atten-
tion to important elements. For example, one subject told to take the
burglar perspective said, "I kept in mind all of the critical things a
burglar would be looking for such as getting in and out, the items that
it would be easy to move and take from the house itself." One assigned
the homebuyer perspective reported, "I spent most of the time looking for
items to be interested in when buying a house." A straightforward way to
get converging evidence on the regulation-of-attention hypothesis would
Schema-Directed Processes
22
be to time subjects on chunks of text material whose importance has been
manipulated in some way. We haven't done experiments of this type yet.
In summary, in this section I have reviewed evidence that a schema
operative when a passage is read affects encoding, possibly by directing
attention to text elements that are significant in the light of the schema.
Evidence was presented which shows that later the schema affects remembering,
probably in part by providing the plan for searching memory. Schemata
probably also provide the basis for inferential elaboration when a passage
is read and inferential reconstruction when there are gaps or inconsis-
tencies in memory.
Implications of Schema Theory for Education
Text information is interpreted, organized, and retrieved in terms of
high-level schemata. It follows that the student who doesn't possess
relevant schemata is going to have trouble learning and remembering the
information encountered in stories and textbooks. Consider for illustra-
tion the description of an unfamiliar nation in a geography text (cf.
Anderson, Spiro, & Anderson, 1977). The mature student will bring to
bear an elaborate Nation schema which incorporates well-formed subschemata
for assimilating information about the topography, climate, economy,
culture, and political system. It is only a slight oversimplification
to say that the task for the advanced student is simply to fill the slots
in an already formed schema with the particular information in the text
about the unfamiliar nation. The information will be readily acquired
and, once acquired, easily retrieved when needed.
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How about the young reader who, for the sake of the argument, will
be assumed not to possess a refined Nation schema? In the worst case a
description of an unfamiliar nation would be unintelligible to such a
reader, like the Bransford and Johnson (1973) passages for mature readers
when a schema-evoking context was not provided. More likely, the young
reader will have a partly formed Nation schema sufficient for some level
of understanding of the material, but which will not enable a representa-
tion of great depth or breadth.
Whether people possess the schemata appropriate for assimilating a
text should be an important source of individual differences in reading
comprehension. Smiley, Oakley, Worthen, Campione and Brown (1977) have
obtained some evidence suggesting that this may be the case. Good and
poor readers drawn from seventh-grade classes read one folktale and
listened to another. Following each story, they were tested for compre-
hension and recall. Under both reading and listening conditions, good
readers recalled a greater proportion of the stories and the likelihood
of their recalling a particular element was an increasing function of the
element's structural importance. Poor readers not only recalled less of
the stories, but their recall was not as clearly related to variations
in importance. Smiley et al. went on to show that it was necessary to
test children as young as first grade before finding another group which
showed as little sensitivity to gradations of importance as poor reading
seventh graders (see also Brown & Smiley, 1977). On the other hand,
Perfetti and Lesgold (in press) have summarized several studies which,
by and large, have not revealed substantial differences among good and
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poor readers in sensitivity to sentence structure or text structure.
Thus, based on evidence already available, it is too early to say
whether variations in high level schemata, or facility in using these
schemata, will turn out to be a consistent difference between good and
poor readers. I hope only to have shown that this is a very reasonable
place to look for differences. If differences are consistently found
there will be implications for diagnosis, design of lesson materials, and
approaches to teaching.
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